Introduction
The main purpose of this paper is to explore what we know and how we & think about firm performance, firm and industry evolution, and economic growth. To this end, we report empirical findings from a new literature jj that focuses explicitly on individual business units. This literature has been J spurred by recent theoretical developments and, perhaps more importantly, the development of longitudinal microdata that track individual plants over | time. In contrast to traditional empirical studies of competition and economic * growth that examine aggregate economic variables such as industry or |" regional productivity, this new work concentrates on differences in thê behavior of firms and their business units. The results emerging from these 1 analyses confirm the importance of microeconomic approaches to economic 2 research and place the firm at the center of economic growth.
The idea that differences in firms are important in the understanding of economic growth and the performance of capitalist economies is not new to economists. Schumpeter (1942) described the process by which competition produces economic growth and improvements in living standards as one of 'creative destinction'. Firms constantly search for new products and new ways of doing things to try to gain competitive advantage.
The fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in motion comes from the new consumers' goods, the new methods of production or transportation, the new markets, the new forms of industrial organization that capitalist enterprise creates, (p. 83)
Viewed from this perspective, firms are, to put it colloquially, where the action is. Economic growth is not evenly spread across firms. Some firms make correct choices, and these firms prosper and grow. Other firms make mistakes, and these firms contract and die. Economic growth is the outcome of successful firms replacing less successful firms. It is the growth of successful firms and the decline of less successful firms that raises overall productivity.
While Schumpeter's view of the competitive process is compelling, it has not been the primary foundation for empirical research in economics. Academic research has been structured around the 'representative firm' model. In this model, firms in the same industry use the same production processes, produce identical products and face identical costs. Thus, all firms react similarly to shocks and the 'industry' becomes the effective unit of analysis. Using this model has meant that research in industrial organization and economic growth, both theoretical and empirical, has usually focused on explaining differences in 'industry' performance, not the determinants of 'firm' performance and success. This is in sharp contrast to the business literature that focuses on case studies of particular business units and the operation of firms.
Two related impediments account for the paucity of micro approaches to the study of competition and economic growth. First, the lack of statistics at the business unit or plant level has made research in the area difficult. Most governmental statistics are provided at aggregate levels broader than firms or plants. 1 Government data is disseminated in aggregative formats to protect the confidentiality of the data. New programs for data access that provide researchers the means to analyze the microdata and protect respondent confidentiality have been important to the development of the new empirical literature (see McGuckin, 1992 McGuckin and Reznek, 1993; R-H. McGuckin and A. P Reznek, unpublished data) . Second, it is only recently that computer resources have been capable of handling the extensive data and mathematical calculations required for more microeconomic approaches. Both of these previous limitations influenced the direction of economic research toward the representative firm model. 2 With new empirical research possibilities, the past 15-20 years have seen a number of new models in the economic literature describing firm behavior and the associated industry dynamics. A common feature of these models is that uncertainty and limited information cause firms to take different approaches to common problems, thereby generating heterogeneity among firms, even within the same industry or product grouping. These theoretical developments, coupled with new databases and powerful computers, have led to a flood of empirical studies of firm behavior and performance. Generally speaking, the empirical relationships confirm the relevance of the new theoretical approaches. The real world appears much closer to that described by Schumpeter than to the one that exists in most economic models; the behavior of firms within industries differs dramatically.
Heterogeneity in the distribution of business units is pervasive along a wide variety of dimensions. Even within the same geographic areas and the same four-digit industries and five-digit product classes, as defined by the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC), firms differ dramatically. Heterogeneity is observed across time as well as in the cross-section (Davis et al., 1996) . Not only does the growth process differ across firms, it is characterized by large, discrete movements rather than smooth or continuous changes even for those firms in continuous operation (Doms and Dunne, 1994; Power, 1995) . During any time interval, observed changes are 'lumpy' and uneven, some business units open and some grow, while others shrink and die.
Taken together, this evidence rejects representative firm models and empirical analyses based on industry-level observations. Economic performance and competition cannot be understood in terms of differences in the behavior of an 'average' firm in an industry-level analysis.
3 In fact, most of the observed variation in the data is within industries. 4 Moreover, the vast ' A related factor ii that molt economists simply did not think that the biases inherent in misspecified industry-and economy-wide modelj were very large. Of count, in the absence of access to the microdata, there was simply no other alternative than to use the aggregative data.
' For the representative firm model to fail, the functions that aggregate individual firm responses into aggregate variables need to be non-linear. As indicated, this condition is satisfied both in the cross-section and over time.
majority of this variation is not associated with traditional observables such as location, industry, size, age or capital; rather, it is associated with unobserved firm-or business unit-specific factors, many of which appear to be long-lived attributes of the business unit.
We begin the paper with a brief discussion of the new modeling approaches used to explore firm performance and associated industry dynamics. This section is brief, introduced simply to provide context for the main body of the paper. The primary focus of the paper is to describe empirical regularities emerging from the new research with microdata.
We review the empirical literature and describe the emerging empirical regularities that inform our understanding of firm performance and evolution. We make no attempt to be comprehensive in the studies we cover. References are primarily to studies using the Longitudinal Research Database (the LRD, which is housed at CES, an economic research unit of the US Census Bureau), an extensive database of longitudinal plant-level data covering the inputs and outputs of virtually every manufacturing plant in the USA since 1963. This database has supported a large volume and wide range of policy and academic research over the last seven or eight years. 5 The discussion of empirical regularities is organized in terms of a simple empirical model that categorizes the factors that determine a plant's behavior into those (i) specific to the plant; (ii) associated with the firm that owns or manages it; and (iii) related to the industry or products that comprise its output. After describing the empirical regularities in the cross-section, we move to a more dynamic picture of firm performance, 6 reviewing the literature on how firm characteristics change over time and providing some new evidence on how persistent firm performance is across time. We then describe how understanding the underlying firm-level dynamics is critical to understanding industry performance and structure. Firm dynamics, the growth of successful firms and the demise of unsuccessful firms determine observable industry characteristics. Further, the underlying heterogeneity of firms affects how the aggregate economy responds to exogenous shocks. While a clearer picture of firm performance and evolution and how these affect aggregate performance is emerging, more work is needed. We suggest areas for future research in our conclusion. 
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Firm Performance and Evolution
Beyond the Representative Firm, Theoretical Background
Competition is a dynamic process involving many dimensions. Modeling it in ways that allow individual firms to differ is necessarily abstract and complex The criticism of the representative firm approach has a long history. Nelson and Winter (1982) succinctly stated the case for developing explicit models of firm behavior: it {is} inevitable that models built according to the orthodox blueprints miss completely or deal awkwardly with these [a large degree of uncertainty and limited information available to firms trying to decide what is their best strategy] features of economic change, (p. 400) Firms operating in an uncertain world with limited information choose to produce different products and employ different production methods. In turn, these different choices generate heterogeneity among firms, even among firms classified within the same industry. Firms are different-they enter at different times, have different investment patterns, possess different information, use different production technologies, pay different wages and so on-and this causes them to react differently to changes in their environment. Thus firms adjust to economic shocks differently, implying that change is idiosyncratic or firm-specific.
Nelson and Winter were not alone in their attempt to develop new approaches to modeling firm behavior. Jovanovic (1982) and Pakes and Erickson (1989) also developed models of firm performance and behavior that captured the uncertainty and limited information that characterizes firm decision making. In contrast to Nelson and Winter, these authors did not abandon the use of models with long-run equilibrium properties. The equilibrium models feature firms that learn (either actively or passively) about their relative efficiency, their product quality and/or the profitability of their research and development (R&D) as part of ongoing operations, usually within a specific industry. (In the models, the firm's initial position is based on a random draw from a distribution of efficiencies.) As the firms learn about themselves, they make decisions about whether to continue in operation or to close. The models predict systematic differences in firm growth, and generate testable predictions about the distribution of size, age and growth rates of firms within particular industries. The steady state distribution of firms is characterized by heterogeneous firms (firms with different sizes and ages) in which change has a large idiosyncratic (firm-specific) component. Thus, the models provide a framework for structuring empirical analysis of firm and market behavior that allows for (i) intra-industry heterogeneity and (ii) idiosyncratic (firm-specific) sources of change.
A key issue that the new models highlight is that with heterogeneous firms and idiosyncratic sources of growth, selection mechanisms are very important. That is, the factors that determine which firms survive and grow and which fail and die are important both to firm competition and growth and to industry evolution. Firms that are relatively productive will choose to continue in the industry and will grow. Firms that are less productive will lose market share and eventually go out of business. For an excellent example of empirical work using this modeling approach, see Olley and Pakes (1996) . As we discuss in more detail below, just what factors determine firm success and failure remains an important open question.
"Empirical Regularities
Our stated goal is to review what we know and how we think about firm performance and evolution. Recent theoretical developments suggest that, given the degree of uncertainty in the environment and the lack of information about the 'right' way to do something, there is likely to be considerable firm-level heterogeneity. This heterogeneity is the result of experimentation by different firms. Further, the theoretical literature posits that this heterogeneity will affect firm-level dynamics and, ultimately, industry and aggregate performance. What does the empirical literature have to say about this view of the world?
The empirical literature has seen extensions that parallel those in theoretical literature. While this research area is still fairly young, a number of empirical regularities have emerged. Of particular interest, the new empirical work confirms the importance of the theoretical approaches outlined above. For example, the most compelling empirical regularity confronting researchers is the tremendous amount of diversity in firm and plant characteristics and behavior. Even within industries, firms have very different attributes along many observable dimensions such as size, age wages, productivity, job creation and destruction, investment patterns and productivity growth. In fact, within-industry differences among firms along practically every dimension show greater variability than the variability of the average of the same variable between industries (Davis et al., 1996). 7 While there is tremendous heterogeneity in plant characteristics and plant performance, researchers are identifying relationships between theses characteristics and performance. It is useful to think of this variation in plant ' While some of the heterogeneity within industries may mult from poorly defined SICs, this source of error is unlikely to eliminate the heterogeneity since it is observed in virtually all industries and even in product class groupings.
performance as attributable to four sources: (i) plant-specific factors; (ii) characteristics associated with the firm that owns the plant; (iii) factors associated with the industry in which the plant produces; and (iv) a stochastic error component. (We ignore interaction effects for the purposes of this discussion, but they might be significant in the data.) This framework provides a convenient way to categorize the empirical evidence, most of which relies on the plant as the unit of analysis.
8 While the allocation of variables to a particular category is difficult and sometimes arbitrary, from the broad perspective adopted here, such concerns can probably be ignored. It is also useful to distinguish between observable and unobservable variables within each source. Typical variables in the observable category for plant-specific factors include age, size and location-all variables that have been extensively studied.
9 Unobservable variables include many things that are important determinants of behavior and are now beginning to be studied by economists. Prime examples are employment practices, managerial skills, and business unit organization and knowledge. 10 These factors have been the subject of both case studies and special surveys. What is new is that with the advent of broad-based, longitudinal data they are now becoming a subject for more generalized economic research. The new longitudinal microdata have begun to allow researchers to control for previously omitted unobservable characteristics.
Plant Effects
We begin our discussion of plant effects by focusing on size and age. Unless explicitly noted, the results described throughout this section are independent of the particular business unit behavior or performance measure used as the dependent or the 'to be explained' variable. We have chosen to treat size and age separately from other observable plant characteristics because they are by far the most studied. In many respects, these characteristics also offer the most severe problems of interpretation.
Size and Age. As business unit and firm microdata have become available, studies of the relationships between firm (and plant) growth, survival and mortality, and their differences by size and age have been a main focus of empirical efforts. Most of the early work with the microdata focused on policy issues, using sophisticated econometric techniques to son out the influences of various sources of measurement error (transitory stochastic influences reflected in base year observations, regression to the mean problems and arbitrary size classifications). Evans (1987a,b) , Hall (1987) and Dunne et al. (1989) are important examples of this work in the industrial organization tradition, while Brown and Medoff (1990) and Davis et al. (1996) provide insights on size-growth relationships from the labor perspective. There is also substantial work from other countries (e.g. Canada, France, Holland, Australia and Germany) on the relationship of size and job creation and destruction. While the precise relationships differ among countries, this literature has made great strides in showing the potential pitfalls in drawing conclusions based on faulty statistical designs.
The focus on age and size distributions can be attributable in part to the relative availability of measures identifying the size and age of a business unit and firm. But the focus on these variables also reflects the importance of the size distribution in industrial organization analyses, particularly in the antitrust and oligopoly areas and the popularity of industrial policy focused on 'small' business. Much of the work reflects attempts to identify the role of small business in job creation and economic growth, and has been driven by policy concerns. This is a major reason for the focus on statistical issues in the literature.
The relationship of a plant's age to performance is similar to the effect of a plant's size on performance. This is not unexpected because both variables are intimately related to the competitive process. The more a firm grows (the bigger it is) the more likely it is to survive another period (the older it is). But, while size and age are correlated, age has an independent effect on performance. For example, Bates and Nucci (1990) found that the probability of firm failure is inversely related with age, even after controlling for the size of the business. This is not the place to undertake a detailed discussion of size and age. Numerous empirical studies suggest that plants of different sizes have significantly different characteristics and performance. Bigger plants tend to be more capital-intensive, more productive, more likely to adopt technological innovations, more likely to export and pay higher wages. Because size is correlated with all of these other characteristics, it is important to control for size in studies examining plant performance. While it is clear that size and age are important observables that need to be controlled for in 32 empirical models of business behavior, in many respects they raise serious difficulties for empirical researchers. Size and age are outcomes of the competitive process, and to include them in estimating equations designed to explain firm performance begs the question of what factors determine whether firms succeed or fail. Moreover, when the empirical focus is on size and age, the workings of the firm tend to be obscured and the firm is treated as a "black box'. (Bernard and Jensen, 1995) . While virtually every study of plant performance controls for this aspect of the structure of the firm, it is difficult to determine the exact source of the positive relationship found. A positive relationship is likely associated with a positive firm effect-large successful firms are most likely to be multi-unit. It is also the result of measurement error in the plant's performance measure because inputs supplied by the firm are included in the single unit's costs, but not in the multi-unit's.
Standard Control
Capital intensity-assets per employee-is another plant characteristic that is positively associated with plant performance. Capital intensity is also associated with plant size. Bigger plants are more capital-intensive. However, researchers have found that capital intensity is positively associated with plant survival and wages even after controlling for other observable plant characteristics such as size (see, for example, Dunne and Roberts, 1990 ).
Other Variables. Researchers have been able to merge data from sources other than the basic LRD data (e.g. Special Census Bureau Surveys) to create new datasets with additional variables. Such datasets have been invaluable in extending the list of factors that have been empirically linked to business unit performance. Importantly, they tend to bring the detail of the case study approach to the more general setting of the typical economic study. They accomplish this by developing econometric experimental models that exploit general databases with probabilistic designs, like the ERD, to control for selection and other biases inherent in studies relying on particular cases or limited survey information. See Jarmin (1995) for a more complete description of this approach in the context of evaluating a particular government program.
One survey that has been particularly fruitful in this regard is the Survey of Manufacturing Technology (SMT). The SMT is a plant-level survey covering four two-digit manufacturing industries (SICs 34-38). It develops information on the use of 17 relatively recent advanced computer-based technologies. Examples of such technology include robotics and computer-aided design (CAD). Dunne (1991) and Dunne and Schmitz (1992) explored the relationship between plant characteristics, wages and technology adoption using a 1988 version of the survey. In addition, Doms et al. (1996) Dunne and Troske (1996) These studies suggest that larger plants, multi-unit plants, plants engaged in defense-related production and plants owned by firms with high R&D to sales ratios are more likely to adopt advanced technologies. More technology-intensive plants pay higher wages, are more productive and are more likely to survive than non-adopters.
R&D is also important to plant and firm performance. Lichtenberg and Siegel (1989) found that there is a positive association between firm R&D expenditures and plant total factor productivity. Bernard and Jensen (1995) found that plants that manufacture for export tend to be larger, more productive, more capital-intensive and pay more than plants that do not export. Further, Bernard and Jensen (1996) found that because these plants are more non-production worker-intensive than other non-exporters and have grown as a share of total manufacturing employment, they have contributed significantly to the increase in the wage gap between production and non-production workers.
Another in this general line of studies is based on a new database linking workers to the plants that employ them. The database, termed the Worker-Employee Characteristics Database (WECD), contains detailed information on various personal characteristics of workers (e.g. age, sex, 34 education). The use of this information has substantially improved the explained variation in a number of studies of business unit performance (see Troske, 1995) .
A Note on Evidence From an Earlier Period. Most of the work cited so far is based on data from the 1963-1993 period. However, some historical work with recently uncovered economic census data provides a similar picture of business success to that found in the LRD. Bresnahan and Raff (1991) observed substantial differences in productivity among automotive plants during the 1930s, a time when mass production technology was replacing craft production. The heterogeneity they found was strongly associated with the technology in use at the plant, with plants using mass production techniques showing significantly higher productivity. Today, the 'Toyota system'-craft or custom production through management practices emphasizing flexibility in produced products-appears to represent a return to the pre-Depression era of made-to-order vehicles, but is now supported by new computer-based technologies that allow for efficient adoption of human and organization methods unavailable in the earlier period.
Firm Effects
Several studies point to the importance of firm effects in explaining business unit behavior. For example, Baily et al. (1992) found that plants' productivity has an associated 'firm' effect. As another example, Streitwieser (1991) found that plants classified in the same industry, on the basis of their primary product, differ substantially in their mix of secondary products. Exploiting the fact that many of the plants in the sample were part of multi-unit firms, she found evidence that these differences in the secondary products produced by manufacturing plants could be explained by the plant's ownership structure.
(The product structures of plants change, often dramatically, over time; see McGuckin and Peck (1992) .) Another aspect of ownership status is whether a plant is owned by a multinational firm. Doms and Jensen (1995) found that plants owned by foreign firms and plants owned by US firms with foreign assets are bigger, more productive and pay higher wages. In terms of explained variance, however, these studies, and others introducing a firm fixed-effect into a cross-section performance regression, found that 'firm' effects are small relative to plant-specific factors.
" Bresnahan and Raff(199I) (bund that differences in price-cost margins between business units were not tied to the type of technology used. They appeared more closely aligned with localized competition in product space. In today's world, global competition probably leaves little room for localized rents.
Unfortunately, it is impossible to sort out the precise role of firm-and plant-specific effects on plant behavior without much more sophisticated empirical designs than those available at this time. One problem in studying firm effects is that they are only separately identified in a cross-section analysis for firms composed of multiple plants. This limits sample sizes in many instances. However, it is possible to get some idea about their relative importance by comparing plant performance before and after a firm-level change. One of the most important such changes is an ownership change.
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There is solid evidence that ownership change is associated with significant improvements in business unit performance. Mergers, divestitures, leveraged buyouts, etc. generate changes in the composition of the firm that affect behavior. For example, a series of studies have consistently identified ownership change as an event that increases business unit productivity (see, for example, Lichtenberg and Siegel, 1992; Long and Ravenscraft, 1993; .
Studies of job change and investment at the level of the business unit are also consistent with significant firm effects. Both job changes (Davis et ai., 1996) and investment (Doms and Dunne, 1994) are characterized by large lumpy changes. For example, most jobs are created at plants that scale back dramatically. Job change is concentrated in plants increasing or decreasing their workforces by 25% or more. A very similar picture emerges for capital-adjustments of >37% in 1 year and >50% over 2 years. Thus, jobs typically are gained or lost and new capital acquisition are concentrated in particular plants. The data show that these large changes are not systematic across plants, even those classified in the same industry. 13 Since dramatic changes in operations such as these are often concentrated in times when ownership is changing, this evidence is consistent with significant firm effects. While this evidence is indirect, provide direct evidence that ownership change is related to employment growth.
Industry Effects
Until recently, much of the empirical literature attempted to explain u Many earlier studies (for * review see Mueller, 1993) suggest that mergers have neutral or negative effects on acquiring a firm's performance. These studies for the most part used data from samples composed of large multi-unit firms. Recent work by R. H. McGuckin and S.V Nguyen (unpublished data) indicates that such studies are subject to significant aggregation bias that tends to obscure the positive impacts of merger.
" Most of the job changes described are persistent. On average, 71S of all the jobs created last at least 1 year and 56% last for 2 yean. Job destructions are even more persistent-82% are not regained in 1 year and 74% are still lost 2 years later. This suggests that growth or decline in plants is permanent. So these effects involve real restructuring and change-not transitory movements. differences in industry-level variables, where industry is defined in terms of the SIC system usually at the three-or four-digit level of detail. This literatures is reviewed very well by Schmalensee (1989) . While the economic meaning of industry-level cross-section regression studies of performance measures (such as profitability and price-cost margins) is murky, such studies do suggest that factors that vary across industries are significant in business performance. For example, Dunne and Roberts (1991) conclude a recent study of exit and entry with three observations:
1. Entry and exit rates vary by industry, in both gross and net terms. 2. These rates are stable across time for individual industries, and an industry's relative position in the distribution of entry and exit rates is persistent over time. 3-Consistent with the first two points, positive correlations between industry entry and exit rates are observed at each point in time.
These findings suggest that industry classification is a meaningful concept in the sense that it explains firm behavior. This conclusion is supported by various studies incorporating industry effects into empirical nodels of firm behavior. Industry is important in explaining differences in firm behavior in every recent study using the LRD (e.g. Bernard and Jensen, 1995; Doms and Jensen, 1995; Davis et al., 1996; Doms tt al., 1996; McGuckin et al., 1996) . Moreover, this is not a recent finding or one limited to the LRD database. Gort et al. (1972) found significant industry effects in a fixed effects specification for firm diversification levels measured using Dun and Bradstreet data from the 1960s. Similarly, Cohen and Levin (1989) summarized numerous studies and concluded that 'industry' effects explain a significant portion of firm R&D. Schmalensee (1985) , in an influential contribution, found that industry effects were more important than business unit and firm effects in explaining profitability using Federal Trade Commission lines of business data. Later studies by Kessides (1987) and, in a broader treatment of the issue, Rumelt (1991) showed that while industry effects are significant in explaining profitability, the importance of the industry effect is dramatically reduced from that suggested in Schmalensee's work.
Recent studies with the LRD, such as those cited above, while not directly replicating the earlier studies, found that industry is a significant source of 'explained' variation, but overall it explains very little of the observed variation in plant performance measures along a variety of dimensions. This is consistent with the Rumelt (1991) study that found that plant-specific factors are the more significant determinants of profitability. This means that the source of most of the observed variance in plant behavior is plant-or firm-specific effects.
Other Factors Determining Success
The empirical work discussed above identifies a wide range of characteristics associated with successful performance. Moreover, the results are generally both economically and statistically significant. However, while the relationships are significant, the unexplained residuals associated with them are large (i.e. the explanatory power of the empirical models is strikingly low). The percentage of explained variance tends to be between 10 and 30%. Similar levels of explained variation are found for regressions that use change measures-e.g. job creation, productivity growth, investment-as the performance variable. Thus, most of the variance in the data is unexplained and, therefore, idiosyncratic to the business unit.
This suggests that unobserved business unit characteristics, like management practices, production process and so forth, play a large role in performance differences. In turn, the important determinants of plant performance are now beginning to be studied by economists. Many of these, e.g. differences in plant technologies (process and products) and managerial skills and practices, have been the province of the case study or business school approach. However, with the new longitudinal databases covering large sectors of the economy (e.g. manufacturing) it is possible to study within-plant factors systematically. In attempts to explain more of the variation in performance, researchers have moved to supplement data in the LRD with other ancillary, special surveys. As illustrated by the research with the SMT, described above, this is where much of the current research activity with the LRD is concentrated.
Persistence
We observe considerable variation in business units in the cross-section. We also observe entry, exit, plants growing and plants shrinking over time. This leads to the question: how stable are intra-industry distributions of plant characteristics over time? The evidence on persistence is relatively new, but a picture of how the distribution of plants evolves over time is beginning to emerge.
For example, while there is strong evidence that reallocations of resources from low to high productivity plants are the most important factor in the growth of productivity in the economy, there also appears to be substantial 38 persistence in plant productivities (see Baily et al., 1992; Bartelsman and Dhrymes, 1992; Dwyer, 1995a) . The finding of significant persistence in plant productivity performance across time suggests that permanent characteristics of the business unit account for its superior performance. Recent work by Dwyer (19985b) offers strong support for the existence of such permanent characteristics. He estimates that the persistent effects have a half-life of 10-20 years in the textile industry and explain nearly half of the observed variation in productivity.
Other work also suggests that long-lived characteristics are important determinants of performance. In a very comprehensive study of 13 homogeneous products, Roberts and Supina (1994) found 'clear patterns of price dispersion among producers with the amount of dispersion varying substantially across products but relatively little over time for a given product'. Moreover, they found substantial persistence in the pricing of individual plants compared with what one would expect from random movements. Thus, they conclude that plants have stable permanent differences in costs that are reflected in their product prices, even within narrowly defined product groupings.
The work cited so far on persistence in the distribution of productivity-the most general measure of plant efficiency-is usually based on specific industries and time periods. Therefore, it made sense to derive some simple descriptive statistics on persistence across the entire manufacturing sector. For this purpose, we selected from the LRD all the plants that were producing in 1992 (over 350,000) and from this group of plants we identified all those that were operating in 1987. This gave us a sample that included all plants operating in 1992 that were five or more years old. We then classified each of these plants according to its primary four-digit SIC code. There were 458 four-digit industries in manufacturing in 1992.
For each industry we regressed the plant's relative labor productivity (total shipments/total employment for the plant divided by the average labor productivity for the four-digit industry in which the plant was classified) in 1992 on the similar value for 1987.
14 This yielded 458 regression coefficients, each showing the average relationship between productivity in 1992 and productivity five years earlier for a four-digit industry.
The results of these calculations are displayed in Table 1 by the 20 two-digit manufacturing sectors. Plants in industries with a higher coefficient show greater persistence in the sense that their position in the productivity distribution in 1992 is positively correlated with that in 1987. Table 1 shows that the average (unweighted) industry had a regression coefficient of 0.54 with a variance of 0.08. But the range was quite wide-from ~0.75 for food and tobacco to <0.40 for transportation, furniture and miscellaneous manufacturing.
Since this work is preliminary, we do not want to dwell on it except to note that in all industries, the estimated coefficients are consistent with substantial persistence in the productivity distribution over the five-year interval. The regressions also suggest that transitory factors are important. A plant's productivity in 1992 is positively related to its productivity five years earlier, but the correlation is far from perfect. Thus, in addition to persistence, there appears to be a good deal of regression to the mean in the data. Because of this, some form of a random shock/measurement error model of productivity dynamics is also working. Dwyer (1995b) offers some support for this view.
Taken together, the evidence suggests that a model combining persistence with random shocks, both common and idiosyncratic, is likely to be necessary if we are to explain productivity dynamics. Such dynamic structural models need to be developed and estimated. Analyses examining the relationships of multiple dimensions of performance are a natural extension of the new empirical literature.
Industry Dynamics
While models and empirical work combining the elements of firm-level heterogeneity, firm-level persistence and firm, sectoral and aggregate random shocks are relatively new, evidence is emerging suggesting that this is a fruitful way to think about firm and industry evolution. Researchers are beginning to uncover empirical evidence of the aggregate effect of plant-and firm-level changes.
As noted above, Davis et al. (1996) found the magnitudes of gross employment changes-both job creations and job destructions-to be substantial. On average, 1 in 10 manufacturing jobs are lost in an average year, and 1 in 9 are gained. This means that 19%-almost 20% of all jobs in manufacturing (net changes in jobs-~1% per year-are small relative to gross)-are reallocated among plants each year. Clearly, these figures suggest that change-growth and decline-is a dominant characteristic of the economy.
Davis et al. also found large gross changes in employment at individual plants in every manufacturing industry during the 1972-1988 period they studied. Regardless of whether an industry showed an increase, a decrease or no change in its net employment, the authors observed some plants increasing, some plants decreasing and some plants not changing their employment. A similar pattern of large, idiosyncratic changes has been observed for capital (see Doms and Dunne, 1994; Power, 1995) .
How does the heterogeneity among plants, observed for both levels and changes, affect competition and economic growth? If we observe an industry 41
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at two points in time we can categorize the firms into three categories: stayers-those operating at both the beginning and the end of the period-entrants and exits. Davis et al. (1996) found that a considerable portion of this reallocation of employment involves plants that operate continuously; annually, only 15% of job creation and 22% of job destruction are associated with entry and exit respectively. Even over five-year intervals, entry and exit are not the prime vehicles for expansion and contraction of jobs or output. The story for productivity is similar. In an important empirical study, Baily et al. (1992) investigated the role of plant-level productivity in industry productivity dynamics. Somewhat surprisingly, in light of the large turnover of plants through entry and exit in most industries (entry and exit are relatively larger in terms of number of business units, at 35-40% over a typical five-year period), the Baily et al. study found that entry and exit are relatively unimportant in aggregate productivity growth, even over the full 15-year period they study. Roughly two-thirds of the aggregate productivity growth is attributable to gains in market shares by the most efficient producers and declines in market share by the least efficient." This basic finding-that the most productive business units grow faster and are less likely to exit-has been confirmed by a host of studies with the LRD (see Dhrymes, 1989; Bartelsman and Dhrymes, 1992; Roberts and Supina, 1994; Dwyer, 1995a,b; Olley and Pakes, 1996) . In turn, there is convincing support for the proposition that economic growth is achieved via a competitive selection process in which the most efficient firms survive. Caballero et al. (1995) suggested that understanding the distribution of plant attributes is important to understanding how an industry or sector will respond to a random shock. They examined the response of plant-level investment to changes in tax policy. They found that aggregate investment behavior depends on plant-level adjustments to capital. This, in turn, depends on the distribution of plant characteristics and past plant decisions. This research begins to integrate aspects of plant heterogeneity, persistence and random shocks into a model of how plants and industries evolve.
As another example, consider the problem of evaluating product choice and energy usage decisions in reaction to a change in energy prices. This kind of n There are reasons to believe that the entry/exit effects are minimized in their empirical decomposition ind that some of the plant-specific growth reflects growth by entrants subsequent to their entry. The problem is that low-productivity firms exit and the entrants that replace them also typically exhibit below average productivity at the time of entry. But surviving entrants grow very quickly and improve productivity, reaching average levels in 5-10 years. Thus, a good deal of the 'plant' growth effect observed by the authors-about one-third of aggregate productivity growth-may be associated with subsequent growth by entrants. Alexander (1994, p. 8) makes this point.
problem arises in assessments of economic or environmental policies such as the imposition of an energy tax. In the absence of a model and data at the plant level, an analysis completely describing the effects of the policy change is not possible. In this application, the responses of small, high-mileage car makers and low-mileage car producers will differ. Also, poor people who cannot afford to shift to new, high-mileage cars will bear a significant burden of the tax. They will continue to use their high-mileage cars longer than high-income drivers (income effect). Aside from equity issues, this will affect the dynamic adjustments and delay increases in the miles per gallon of the average car on the road. A. Pakes (unpublished data) explicitly modeled the role of plant and firm differences in his analysis of the effect on the auto industry of changes in energy costs.
Concluding Observations
Heterogeneity is a fact of life among firms and their business units. It is the most pervasive attribute of the data and is found across all sectors no matter how the sector is defined-by industry, region, size, etc. Once you group business units on one variable, they vary on virtually all others. For example, the various studies found significant differences in the product structure, productivity, productivity growth rates, investment, export activity, merger, organization, technology, age, mark-up differences, R&D, ability to assimilate new technologies, rate of learning by doing, job creation, job destruction, environmental emissions, capital intensity, etc. among business units classified in the same industry.
Firms are not only different in the cross-section; they enter at different times and make different choices about the products they produce and the technologies they use. In turn, their different circumstances mean that they react differently, even to common external shocks. Heterogeneity is observed across time as well as in the cross-section. During any time interval, observed changes among firms in the same industry are uneven and idiosyncratic as some open and some grow, while others shrink and die.
Thus, to understand economic performance and competition, one must move beyond representative firm models. Since most of the observed variation in the data is within industries, economic change cannot be understood in terms of the behavior of an 'average' firm in an industry-level analysis.
The empirical evidence supports the view that some firms will succeed (that is, survive and grow) and others will fail (lose market share and go out of business). Thus, competition can be characterized as a process in which successful firms grow and lead industry growth at the expense of less efficient rivals.
But what factors distinguish successful firms from unsuccessful ones? While the empirical evidence has identified a wide variety of factors associated with successful firms, the evidence is not clear on what lies behind the observed relationships. For example, the evidence that adoption of advanced technology is positively related to performance is overwhelming. But does this positive association reflect the impact of the technology on the efficiency (competitiveness) of the adopting firm, or is it primarily a manifestation of well-managed efficient firms being more likely to adopt advanced technologies?
The problem is that much of the research discussed above has used models that explore pair-wise correlations among variables. While establishing correlation is an important first step, the results should not be interpreted as causal relationships between business unit characteristics. The observed correlations can reflect a positive relationship between performance and technology adoption because both of these variables are positively correlated with a third, unobserved factor. This is a real possibility. The vast majority of variation in firm performance is not associated with traditional observables such as location, industry, size, age or capital; rather, it is associated with unobserved factors specific to the firm or business unit, many of which appear to be permanent attributes of the business unit. One such attribute is the managerial capital of the firm, another is the skills of its workforce.
The most important area for research is the development and estimation of models that disentangle the causes and effects of firm growth. 16 A logical next step in this line of research is to flesh out a more complete picture of the relationships between plant characteristics and plant performance. Causal models would allow us to move beyond more simple correlations to answer such specific questions as: do plants that have higher wages grow? Or is it that successful plants grow and then later pay higher wages? What is the relationship of exporting and success? Do exporters become successful firms or do successful firms become exporters? How long does it take before strong productivity growth yields improved business outcomes, and what is the strength of that relationship? Answers to these and similar questions can, in turn, help identify firms that show particular potential for success.
" A. Bernard and J. B. Jensen (unpublished d»ti) have begun to disentangle the relationship between plant characteristics, performance and exporting in a dynamic model. They found that better plants do become exporter* and there a tome evidence of gainj from exporting-thus underlining the need for more sophisticated modeling approaches.
